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Abstract 
 
The paper summarizes various agency cost and market theories of insider trading 
propounded over the course of the perennial law and economics debate over insider 
trading.  The paper then suggests three testable hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between insider trading laws and several measures of financial performance.  Using 
international data and alternative regression specifications, the paper finds that more 
stringent insider trading laws and enforcement are generally associated with greater 
ownership dispersion, greater stock price accuracy and greater stock market liquidity.  
This set of findings provides empirical support to theoretical arguments in favor of more 
stringent insider trading legislation and enforcement.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Early legal scholarship on insider trading (trading by corporate insiders on 
material, non-public information) tended to focus on the morality of insider trading.  The 
central issue in the early academic debate was whether insider trading is fair, particularly 
to outside investors (see, e.g., Schotland, 1967).  However, this approach lacked a 
rigorous theoretical framework and thus did not generate useful legal and policy 
prescriptions.  When he proposed the controversial notion that insider trading is 
economically efficient, Henry Manne (1966) abruptly shifted the debate from a focus on 
morality to a discussion about the economics of insider trading.  At the core of the law 
and economics debate is the question whether insider trading is economically inefficient 
and thus ought to be subject to government regulation, or whether it is economically 
efficient and thus ought not to be regulated.  Scholars on one side of this debate argue 
that insider trading is economically efficient and therefore prohibiting it is undesirable, 
indeed irrational.  The other side claims that insider trading is economically inefficient 
and therefore government regulation ought to prohibit it.     
Law and economics theories of insider trading fall into two categories: agency 
theories and market theories of insider trading.  Agency theories of insider trading focus 
on the impact of trading by corporate insiders on firm-level efficiency and corporate 
value.  The manager-shareholder conflict is the core theoretical lens through which these 
theories address the desirability of insider trading.  Those who advocate insider trading 
on agency grounds claim that it ameliorates the manager-shareholder conflict of interest, 
while those who oppose it claim that it worsens the conflict.  In contrast, market theories 
of insider trading emphasize the broader market implications of insider trading.  These 
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theories address insider trading’s effect on market performance, e.g., liquidity and stock 
price accuracy.  
The law and economics approach undoubtedly has advanced the academic and 
policy debate about insider trading.  However, one of the debate’s major shortcomings is 
that it is insufficiently grounded in empirical evidence, even though the “desirability of 
[regulating] insider trading is ultimately an empirical question.”  (Carlton and Fischel, 
1983, p. 866).  A related shortcoming of the law and economics debate over insider 
trading is that it is American-centered.  Opponents of U.S. insider trading laws believe 
that they award special interest groups at the expense of economic efficiency (see, e.g., 
Haddock and Macey, 1986a, 1987).  Often, these critics mechanically apply the same 
logic to foreign stock markets, without due regard for economic, legal and institutional 
differences among countries (see, e.g., Haddock and Macey, 1986b). 
The role of insider trading legislation in comparative financial structure and 
performance is therefore an interesting empirical question.  In this article, I empirically 
examine insider trading laws and enforcement across countries.1  Using legal and 
economic data from a cross-section of countries, I find that countries with more stringent 
insider trading laws generally have more dispersed equity ownership, more liquid stock 
markets, and more informative stock prices.  These findings are consistent with agency 
and market theories that emphasize the costs of insider trading and advocate public 
                                                 
1 This work adds to the growing body of research on comparative corporate law and securities 
regulation. Widely cited examples of this literature include Shleifer and Vishny (1997a); La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shelifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999); Bebchuk and Roe (1999); Coffee (1999). 
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legislation, and are inconsistent with theories that emphasize the benefits of insider 
trading and oppose regulatory intervention.  
The article is organized as follows.  Part II reviews the law and economics 
literature (agency and market theories) on insider trading.  In Part III, I present three 
testable hypotheses.  Part IV describes the data and presents summary statistics.  In 
Part V, I present and discuss the regression results.  Finally, Part VI concludes and 
suggests potential avenues for future research. 
II. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS DEBATE OVER INSIDER TRADING 
Law and economics theories about insider trading fall into two main categories: 
agency theories and market theories.2  Agency theories of insider trading analyze the 
effect of insider trading on the classic corporate agency problem: the manager-
shareholder conflict of interest (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  These theories assess 
whether insider trading ameliorates or worsens this conflict.  Analyses of insider trading 
from this perspective are concerned primarily with the effect of insider trading on firm 
efficiency.  In contrast, market theories of insider trading are concerned with the broader 
market implications of insider trading.  These approaches to insider trading address its 
effect on market efficiency, as reflected in measures like stock market liquidity and stock 
price accuracy. 3 
                                                 
2 Proponents and opponents of insider trading regulation often defend their arguments on both agency 
and market efficiency grounds.  However, this categorization of the arguments is a useful organizing 
tool. 
3 These market features are often referred to collectively as market integrity (see, e.g., Bhattacharya and 
Daouk, 2000). 
6
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A. Agency Theories of Insider Trading 
Agency theories of insider trading analyze the effects of insider trading on agency 
costs, as defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976).4  If insider trading reduces (increases) 
the divergence between shareholders’ and managers’ interests, then it reduces (increases) 
agency costs.  Law and economics proponents of unregulated insider trading argue that 
insider trading reduces the manager-shareholder conflict of interest.  In contrast, 
proponents of insider trading regulation argue that insider trading exacerbates the conflict 
and hence increases agency costs.  The central point of contention is whether insider 
trading is beneficial to shareholders or whether, instead, it represents an inefficient 
private benefit of control that accrues to managers at shareholders’ expense.5 
1. Insider Trading as an Efficient Compensation Mechanism 
Manne (1966) argues that insider trading is economically efficient because it 
motivates entrepreneurial innovation.  According to Manne (1966), it is difficult to 
compensate entrepreneurs because, unlike capitalists and salaried employees, 
entrepreneurs are difficult to identify in advance.  Anyone from regular salaried 
employees to top executives may generate profitable innovations (Manne, 1966).  This 
makes it difficult to set entrepreneurs’ pay in advance.  The “indeterminancy of results” 
is another reason why it is difficult to contract over entrepreneurial compensation:    
                                                 
4 Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of the shareholders’ monitoring costs, the 
managers’ bonding costs, if any, and the residual loss, which is the decrease in shareholders’ welfare 
caused by the divergence between the managers’ decisions and the decisions that would maximize the 
shareholders’ wealth.  Easterbrook (1985) was among the first to raise the possibility that insider 
trading is an agency problem. 
5 Grossman and Hart (1982) describe managers’ benefits as private benefits of control. 
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True innovation cannot be predicted nor its value known before it has been 
thought of and made effective.  True innovation cannot be planned and 
budgeted in advance.  An individual cannot be hired to perform x amount 
of entrepreneurial service.  (Manne, 1966, p. 133). 
Due to the dynamic nature of innovation it is virtually impossible to contract over it in 
advance (Manne, 1966). 
Through insider trading, entrepreneurs can be rewarded in direct proportion to and 
contemporaneously with their innovations (Manne,1966).  Entrepreneurial innovation 
creates valuable new information (at the most basic level, information that there has been 
an innovation) and the first person to know about it is the entrepreneur responsible for the 
innovation.  She can profit by buying the company’s shares before the public learns of the 
innovation and before their value rises to reflect the positive news.  Even if the 
entrepreneur is wealth-constrained and thus cannot buy unlimited shares, she can “sell” 
this information to others (Manne, 1966).  In this manner, according to Manne (1966), 
insider trading “readily allows corporate entrepreneurs to market their innovations,” thus 
forging a closer link between entrepreneurial compensation and innovation (Manne, 
1966, p. 138).  Since it maximizes their incentives to innovate, insider trading is the best 
way to compensate entrepreneurs (Manne, 1966). 
Carlton and Fischel (1983) recast Manne’s efficient compensation thesis in the 
language of the economics of agency.  They argue that insider trading is efficient because 
it reduces agency costs.  According to Carlton and Fischel (1983), relying on capital and 
product markets to discipline managers is insufficient because these markets work 
imperfectly, making it relatively difficult to remove poorly performing managers.  Ex 
8
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ante compensation contracts are also inadequate because they often require costly 
“periodic renegotiations ex post based on (imperfectly) observed effort and output.”  
(Carlton and Fishcel, 1983, p. 869).  In contrast, insider trading enables managers to 
update continuously their compensation in light of new information without incurring 
renegotiation costs (Carlton and Fischel, 1983).  In this manner, insider trading increases 
mangers’ incentives by linking their “fortunes more closely to those of the firm.”  
(Carlton and Fischel, 1983, p. 877). 
Carlton and Fischel also claim tha t insider trading improves the managerial labor 
market: 
A related advantage of insider trading is that it provides firms with 
valuable information concerning prospective managers.  It is difficult for 
firms to identify those prospective managers who will work hard and not 
be overly risk averse in their choice of investment projects.  Basing 
compensation in part on insider trading is one method for sorting superior 
from inferior managers.  Because insider trading rewards those managers 
who create valuable information and are willing to take risks, managers 
who most prefer such compensation schemes may be those who are the 
least risk averse and the most capable.  (Carlton and Fischel, 1983, pp. 
871-872). 
Because the ability to engage in insider trading causes the most able managers to self-
select into firms that allow it, insider trading reduces both screening and monitoring costs 
(Carlton and Fischel, 1983). 
2. Insider Trading as an Agency Problem 
9
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Proponents of insider trading regulation emphasize the rent-extraction potential of 
insider trading.  They argue that rather than serving as an incentive-alignment device, 
insider trading might exacerbate agency costs (Kraakman, 1991; Klock, 1994).  One way 
this might occur is by distorting the managerial wage-setting process (Kraakman,1991).  
By engaging in insider trading, managers might be able to undo any deal worked out ex 
ante and thus sabotage performance-based compensation schemes (Kraakman, 1991).  As 
a result, firms might have to monitor managers’ trading ex post, offsetting the presumed 
cost savings.6  In addition, it is very difficult in practice to ensure that those who produce 
valuable information (i.e., innovations) are the only ones who are able to profit from it 
(Cox, 1986).7  This non-excludability feature of insider trading benefits could generate a 
free-rider problem, or worse, lead to information hoarding within the firm, thus reducing 
insiders’ incentives to innovate and ultimately firm efficiency (Haft, 1982).  
Proponents of insider trading legislation also claim that allowing managers to 
trade on inside information might give them incentives to take on too much risk or to 
undertake value-reducing projects (Klock, 1994).8  Since insider trading is more 
                                                 
6 Even Carlton and Fischel, ardent proponents of deregulation, acknowledge that “[b]anning insider 
trading would prevent insiders from undoing compensation agreements in this manner.”  (Carlton and 
Fischel, 1983, p. 873.) 
7 Cox notes that “most (U.S.) insider-trading cases have not involved those whose entrepreneurial or 
other managerial efforts have produced the value-increasing event that was traded upon.  Instead, the 
defendants have been outside directors, professionals, or clerks whose assistance was used to complete 
the transaction, not to create it.” (Cox, 1986, p. 653). 
8 The ability to short-sell exacerbates this problem, by allowing insiders to benefit from trading on bad 
news. 
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profitable the more volatile are stock prices, it might encourage managers to engage in 
excessively risky investment behavior.9  In addition, since managers can profit from 
insider trading whether the firm is performing poorly or well, insider trading increases 
managers’ incentives to under-perform (Anabtawi, 1989; Kraakman, 1991). 
B. Market Theories of Insider Trading  
Independent of its firm-level agency implications, insider trading might also have 
external effects (Goshen and Parchomovsky, 2001; Krawiec, 2001).  Market theories of 
insider trading address these potential effects.  
1. Is Insider Trading an Efficient Disclosure Mechanism? 
Corporate disclosure is beneficial but costly. 10  Opponents of insider trading 
legislation argue that insider trading serves as a less costly substitute for traditional 
means of information disclosure (Carlton and Fischel,1983).  They argue that disclosure 
                                                 
9 “The option-like character of returns from insider trading rewards the selection of projects with volatile 
payouts, regardless of whether they have a positive or negative return on net.”  (Kraakman, 1991, p. 
52). 
10 Information disclosure by firms has public goods-like features.  Firms bear most of the costs of 
disclosure, but do not reap the full benefits, which are dispersed among the firm, rival firms and 
investors.  Thus, firms might disclose less than the socially optimal amount (Arrow, 1962; Coffee, 
1984; Fox, 1999).  In some cases, disclosure might even be detrimental to investors by revealing too 
much.  For example, investors in an oil company would be harmed if the firm prematurely announced 
that it has discovered additional reserves on land that it is buying, since that would raise the purchase 
price.  Therefore, the socially optimal amount of disclosure lies between no disclosure and complete 
disclosure.  Other things equal, a lower cost of disclosure will increase the amount of disclosure that a 
firm makes. 
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through insider trading is less costly because it moves prices toward their full disclosure 
value, without some of the costs associated with full disclosure:   
Through insider trading, a firm can convey information it could not 
feasibly announce publicly because an announcement would destroy the 
value of the information, would be too expensive, not believable, or – 
owing to the uncertainty of the information – would subject the firm to 
massive damage liability if it turned out ex post to be incorrect.  (Carlton 
and Fischel, 1983, p. 868). 
When insiders trade on the basis of private information (e.g., a new discovery, an 
impending merger, etc.) prices will adjust to reflect the news, but without prematurely 
revealing the underlying information (Carlton and Fischel, 1983).  
Advocates of insider trading regulation question its utility as a cheap substitute for 
traditional disclosure methods on several grounds, however.  First, they argue that insider 
trading is likely to distort managers’ incentives to disclose information in a timely 
manner (Kraakman, 1991).  Insiders’ ability to profit from insider trading depends 
fundamentally on their superior access to information.  The more that they can control the 
leakage of information, the more they stand to gain from insider trading.  This might 
include hoarding information to the detriment of both price accuracy and the firm’s 
operational efficiency (Haft, 1982). 
Second, it might be difficult for outsiders to detect insiders’ trades.  One reason is 
that insiders might deliberately hide their trading, in order to “preserve their 
informational monopolies, even if their activities were legal” (Kraakman, 1991, p. 50): 
12
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It will be very costly to detect an insider’s trades, because he can hide his 
trading activity.  He can buy stock in street names or through nominees 
(including trusts and family members); he may route orders through a 
chain of brokers to make tracing difficult; the list of evasive devices is 
long.  (Kraakman, 1991, p. 50). 
If insiders are able to hide their trades, insider trading will be difficult to discern and any 
advantage of insider trading over traditional forms of disclosure will decrease.  Even if 
insiders do not deliberately hide their trades, they might avoid taking large positions due 
to risk aversion.  If insiders’ trades are insufficiently large, they will be undetectable and 
thus fail to convey new information.  In addition, the more “noise” there is surrounding 
an inside trade, the lower its informational value (Carlton and Fischel, 1983). 
Finally, insider trading opponents argue that whatever advantage it might have 
over traditional disclosure is probably very small.  The argument for insider trading as an 
alternative means of disclosure is strongest when the information in question is the kind 
of information that managers have little ability or incentive to disclose (Kraakman, 1991).  
Familiar examples include complex or ‘soft’ information that cannot be 
communicated effectively, bad news that might embarrass incumbent 
managers, and good news that cannot be released directly without aiding 
an issuer’s competitors or upsetting ongoing negotiations.  (Kraakman, 
1991, p. 51).   
In the case of these kinds of information, insider trading might be a better way to update 
prices than public announcement.  However, for most types of information, traditional 
disclosure is relatively cheap (Kraakman, 1991). 
13
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2. Insider Trading and Liquidity 
Insider trading is profitable due to asymmetry of information among insiders and 
outsiders.  On average, when an insider sells her firm’s stock, she sells for more than the 
stock’s ‘true’ worth and when she buys her firm’s stock, she buys at less than its ‘true’ 
value (Manove, 1989).  The difference between the insider’s purchase or sell price and 
the ‘true’ value is the premium she receives due to having superior information relative to 
outsiders.  This premium represents a trading cost to less informed counter-parties 
(Kraakman, 1991; Georgakopoulos, 1993).11  Thus, controlling for other factors, a market 
characterized by pervasive insider trading might be less liquid than a market in which 
insider trading is less severe.12  If information asymmetry is extreme, uninformed 
investors may refrain from trading altogether, making the stock market illiquid.13 
Advocates of insider trading dismiss its potential adverse effect on liquidity.  
Carlton and Fischel (1983) argue that the fact that uninformed investors trade frequently 
implies that they are not hindered by the existence of more informed parties, whether or 
not the latter are insiders.  That investors trade in spite of asymmetric information 
suggests that their trading decisions might be independent of asymmetric information, 
                                                 
11 “Informed traders ‘take’ part of the stock market returns from the uninformed traders….This ‘taking’ 
thus resembles a transaction cost since it can be avoided by not trading.”  (Georgakopoulos, 1993, p. 
17).  
12 Even Carlton and Fischel, staunch opponents of banning insider trading, acknowledge that “insider 
trading could be detrimental to the extent it reduces liquidity.”  Carlton and Fischel (1983), p. 879.   
13 Akerlof (1970) first established the theoretical connection between information asymmetry and market 
failure, showing that markets malfunction when there is asymmetric information and may break down 
entirely in cases of extreme information asymmetry. 
14
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according to Carlton and Fischel (1983).  Indeed, uninformed investors might trade 
precisely because of informed trading, which increases the accuracy of stock prices: 
That trade occurs suggests that traders either do not believe they are 
uninformed or realize that enough informed trading occurs for the 
prevailing prices to reflect most material information.  (Carlton and 
Fischel, 1983, p. 880). 
In other words, the benefits of improved price accuracy might offset the potential costs of 
trading against better- informed counter-parties. 
Opponents of insider trading regulation argue further that some investors will 
always be more informed than others.  “Smart brokers…cause the same problems as 
smart insiders. Uninformed traders who know they are uninformed should not trade in 
either situation.” (Carlton and Fischel, 1983, pp. 879-880).  Insider trading laws cannot 
eliminate this phenomenon.  Rather, prohibiting insider trading simply redistributes (but 
does not reduce) the profits from informed trading from insiders to market professionals 
and other informed traders (Haddock and Macey, 1986b, 1987).  As a result, banning 
insider trading will not reduce the cost of trading, opponents of insider trading regulation 
argue.   
However, Georgakopoulos (1993) argues that prohibiting insider trading will 
reduce the cost of trading by increasing competition among informed traders.  He argues 
that, because insiders have monopolistic access to information, “they extract more profits 
than a competitive group of informed traders.” (Georgakopoulos, 1993, pp. 20-30). 
Banning trading by corporate insiders thus reduces the total profits of informed trading 
by increasing the number of informed traders and hence the degree of competition among 
15
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them.  As a result, prohibiting insider trading reduces the trading costs due to informed 
trading without compromising price accuracy (Georgakopoulos, 1993). 
Finally, critics of insider trading regulation argue that if insider trading were 
harmful to liquidity, firms would voluntarily prohibit it since greater liquidity is valuable 
(Haddock and Macey, 1986).  The fact that firms do not voluntarily proscribe insider 
trading therefore suggests that it does not harm liquidity.  However, supporters of insider 
trading regulation argue that the reason why firms and their shareholders do not pre-
commit to ban insider trading is because greater liquidity is a public good which firms 
systematically under-provide: 
even if firms know the true correlation of price and transaction costs, they 
may still reduce transaction costs less than is socially desirable if there is a 
benefit to society from low transaction costs and market liquidity which 
firms do not enjoy (in essence, transaction costs are [a positive] 
externality).  (Georgakopoulos, 1993, note 34, p. 69). 
Because firms have insufficient incentives to provide liquidity by banning insider trading 
themselves, markets must rely on government regulation (Georgakopoulos, 1993; Goshen 
and Parchomovsky, 2001). 
III. TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
Law and economics commentators on insider trading have offered little empirical 
evidence in support of their respective claims.  In an attempt to address this shortcoming, 
in this section I formulate three empirical hypotheses about the relationship between 
insider trading law and agency costs; insider trading law and stock price informativeness; 
and insider trading law and stock market liquidity. 
16
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A. Agency Costs, Insider Trading Law and Ownership Concentration 
The difficulty of testing competing agency theories of insider trading is probably 
the reason why few if any such empirical studies exist (see Easterbrook, 1985).  
Nevertheless, it is possible to assess the relationship between agency costs and insider 
trading law indirectly by examining the relationship between the latter and ownership 
structure.  
High ownership concentration is one mechanism by which investors address 
agency problems that are inadequately addressed by the law (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (hereafter LLSV) 1998).  Although some level of ownership 
concentration is desirable to give managers and large shareholders proper incentives to 
maximize firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Bhide, 
1993), ownership might be inefficiently concentrated when legal protections of minority 
investors are weak.  When investor protections are poor, small shareholders might refrain 
from purchasing shares due to the threat of expropriation.  Indeed, LLSV (1998) 
demonstrate empirically that when investor protections are weak, ownership is highly 
concentrated.   
In a theoretical model that specifically addresses insider trading, Ausubel (1990) 
suggests that insider trading might reduce outsiders’ willingness to participate in the 
stock market.  Ausubel (1990) defines investor confidence as “the rational belief by 
outsiders that their return on investment is not being diluted by insiders’ trading.”  
(Ausubel, 1990, p. 1023).  His model shows that insider trading law (in particular, a 
17
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“disclose or abstain rule”14) increases investor confidence and encourages greater outside 
investment.  Conversely, when insider trading is freely permitted, outsiders are 
discouraged due to the fear that their investments will be diluted as a result of insiders’ 
trading (Ausubel, 1990). 
Similarly, Maug (2002) demonstrates that insider trading might discourage 
outside ownership.  In Maug’s (2002) model, banning insider trading aligns the 
incentives of dominant and small shareholders.  In particular, large shareholders are more 
likely to monitor managers and company performance when insider trading is prohibited.  
However, when insider trading is not banned, managers may bribe large shareholders not 
to monitor by sharing inside information on which large shareholders may profitably 
trade.  Consequently, trading profits are an opportunity cost of monitoring for large 
shareholders.  If these profits are sufficiently high, dominant shareholders will forego 
monitoring altogether and collude with managers “to conceal adverse information and 
protect managers’ private benefits from control” as well as their own trading profits 
(Maug, 2002, p. [ ]).  As a result, small investors will be more reluctant to invest in 
corporate shares when insider trading legislation is weak because the risk of 
expropriation by managers and dominant shareholders is high. 15 
This suggests the following testable hypothesis.  
                                                 
14 The U.S. S.E.C. first articulated the “disclose or abstain” rule in the enforcement action In re Cady, 
Roberts & Co. (40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)) as follows: “An insider in possession of material nonpublic 
information must disclose such information before trading or, if disclosure is impossible or improper, 
abstain from trading.” (Bainbridge, 1999, p. 42).  Several countries have adopted a similar rule. 
15 According to Maug, insider trading legislation is “a prerequisite for dispersed ownership and liquid 
public markets.” (Maug, 2002, p. [ ]). 
18
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Hypothesis 1:  Tougher insider trading laws are associated with greater 
outside ownership (i.e., lower ownership concentration).    
Hypothesis 1 implies that countries with tougher (weaker) insider trading laws have more 
(less) outside ownership, other things equal. 
B. Insider Trading Law and the Information Content of Stock Prices 
As noted in Part II, law and economics scholars disagree about the potential 
impact of insider trading on stock price accuracy.  Opponents of regulating insider 
trading argue that insider trading enhances stock price accuracy, while proponents of 
regulation argue that the opposite is true. 
Risk arbitrageurs (informed traders) play an important role in price formation 
with respect to both the degree and the kind of information that is impounded into stock 
prices.  They invest time and resources in discovering firm-specific (proprietary) 
information; their profits from trading against less informed parties motivate them to 
conduct this kind of research.  At the same time, arbitrageurs’ activities generate external 
benefits.  In particular, the collective trading of many risk arbitrageurs leads to more 
efficient capitalization of firm-specific information into stock prices, making stock prices 
more informative (Grossman, 1976; French and Roll, 1986; Roll, 1988; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997b).  In turn, more informative stock prices lead to a more efficient allocation 
of capital (Wurgler, 2000).   
Weak investor protections discourage this kind of informed trading by increasing 
the likelihood of expropriation and therefore making arbitrage less profitable (Morck, 
19
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Yeung and Yu, 2000).16  The ultimate effect is less informative stock prices.  Weak 
insider trading laws might have the same effect.  As Maug (2002) shows, weak insider 
trading laws might facilitate expropriation of outside investors by insiders and large 
shareholders.  This risk of expropriation might discourage informed traders from 
investing in company-specific research, making stock prices less informative about 
company-specific developments (Morck, Yeung and Yu, 2000). 
Insider trading might also reduce the accuracy of stock prices by reducing the 
level of competition in the market for information.  Fishman and Hagerty (1992) 
demonstrate that insider trading has two potential adverse effects.  The first effect is a 
lower total number of informed traders in the market, since “the presence of a better-
informed insider deters noninsiders from acquiring information and trading.” (Fishman 
and Hagerty, 1992, p. 107).  The second effect is an uneven distribution of information; 
the insider has more information than the rest of the market.  Together these effects 
reduce the amount of competition in the market and thus lead to less informative stock 
prices (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992).17 
Finally, insider trading might reduce stock price accuracy by increasing corporate 
insiders’ incentives to manipulate information disclosure in order to maximize their 
trading profits (Benabou and Laroque, 1992).  For the foregoing reasons, insider trading 
                                                 
16 For example, Khanna and Palepu (1999) argue that interlocking control in the form of business groups, 
which are common in markets with weak investor protections, is associated with opaque income 
shifting among group-affiliated firms. 
17 This argument is consistent with those made by legal scholars Kraakman (1991) and Georgakopoulos 
(1993). 
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might reduce arbitrageurs’ incentives to invest in company-specific research.  The 
ultimate result is less informed trading and thus lower capitalization of firm-specific 
information into stock prices.  This implies the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Stock prices are less informative when insider trading laws 
are weak. 
Hypothesis 2 implies that countries with more lax (stringent) insider trading laws have 
less (more) informative stock prices, other things equal.   
C. Insider Trading Law and Liquidity 
Market microstructure studies show that information asymmetry can compromise 
equity market liquidity by increasing the cost of trading (Copeland and Galai,1983; 
Glosten and Harris,1988; Leland,1992).  In Copeland and Galai (1983), dealers subsidize 
their losses vis-a-vis informed traders by charging liquidity traders an immediacy fee, 
commonly referred to as the bid-ask spread.  The bid-ask spread is essentially the cost of 
trading.  The greater is the degree of asymmetric information, the greater is the bid-ask 
spread and hence the lower is liquidity (Stoll, 1989).18 
Since insider trading is a type of informed trading, the microstructure literature 
suggests that it should be associated with lower stock market liquidity, controlling for 
other factors.   The greater the incidence of insider trading, the greater are the potential 
costs of trading as market makers raise bid-ask spreads to reflect the probability that they 
are trading against more informed corporate insiders (Georgakopoulos, 1993).  Moreover, 
                                                 
18 Stoll (1989) decomposes bid-ask spreads of NASDAQ/NMS stocks into the following components: 
43% due to adverse information costs, 10% due to inventory holding costs, and 47% due to order 
processing costs. 
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allowing insiders to trade freely gives them an informational monopoly (Fishman and 
Hagerty, 1992; Georgakopolous, 1993; Shin, 1996), leading to higher transactions costs 
(lower liquidity) relative to a world in which informed outsiders compete amongst 
themselves for trading profits (i.e., a world in which insider trading is prohibited) 
(Georgakopoulos,1993; Shin 1996).   
This implies the following hypothesis 
Hypothesis 3:  The stock market is more liquid when insider trading laws 
are more stringent.   
Hypothesis 3 implies that, other things equal, countries with tougher (more lax) laws 
against insider trading have more liquid (less liquid) equity markets.   
In Parts IV and V, respectively, I present the data and empirical results from tests 
of Hypotheses 1-3. 
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
The sample consists of a cross-section of 36 countries.  Their stock markets range 
from long-established and highly developed stock markets to newly emerging markets.  
Some of the markets are highly regulated, and others are only minimally regulated. In 
addition, the corporate laws, corporate governance structures, institutions and legal 
traditions of the sample countries are considerably diverse. 
A. Data Sources 
The data on insider trading regulation and enforcement come from several 
sources.  To conduct the empirical tests, I construct a unique quantitative index of the 
stringency of insider trading law for each country based on its written insider trading laws 
(Gaillard, 1992; Stamp and Welsh, 1996).  The insider trading index consists of five 
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separate binary variables.  Each component of the index represents a separate element of 
the country’s insider trading law.   
The first component of the insider trading law index addresses whether tippees are 
legally considered to be secondary insiders and are therefore subject to the same insider 
trading restrictions as primary insiders.  A tippee is a third person (a corporate outsider) 
who has been tipped about material, non-public information by an insider (a director, 
manager, employee, etc.).  If tippees are prohibited from trading, the variable tippee 
equals one; otherwise, tippee equals zero.  The law of many countries holds tippees liable 
for trading if they have sufficient knowledge, or reason to know, that the information they 
are receiving is sensitive and private, and that the person who has tipped them is a 
corporate insider whom the law prohibits from divulging or using such information for 
non-corporate purposes.19  On the other hand, in some countries corporate outsiders are 
not prohibited from trading on private information received from corporate insiders.20  I 
consider an insider trading law to be tougher if it forbids tippee trading. 
The second component of the insider trading law variable considers whether an 
insider can be held liable not only for trading but also for tipping third parties (i.e., giving 
material non-public information to a non- insider) and/or encouraging them to trade on 
such information.  If so, the variable tipping equals one; if not, it equals zero.  At first 
glance, this variable and the tippee variable appear redundant.  However, they are distinct 
considerations.  Tippee considers the liability of third parties (corporate outsiders), while 
tipping considers the liability of insiders who tip such parties.  In some countries, insiders 
                                                 
19 See Table 1. 
20 See Table 1. 
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are liable for tipping outsiders, while those whom they have tipped are not liable for their 
subsequent trading on such information. 21  A prohibition on trading by insiders is 
arguably less meaningful if insiders can tip outsiders with impunity.  Most countries that 
prohibit insider trading also prohibit insiders’ tipping of outsiders.22 
Fines or damages are the third component of the insider trading law variable.  The 
variable damages equals one if monetary penalties are proportional to insiders’ trading 
profits, and zero otherwise.  Potential violators of the law will weigh the expected cost 
(the probability of being caught times the monetary or criminal penalty) against the 
expected profits from engaging in insider trading.  The higher the cost, the lower the 
incentive to violate the law.  If monetary penalties are less than proportionate to profits, 
their deterrent role is relatively weak, holding constant the probability of detection. 23  Of 
course, the probability of detection is not constant; some regimes have superior 
surveillance (detection) mechanisms than others.  For example, the United States is 
undoubtedly superior to India in this regard.  Unfortunately, I do not have information on 
countries’ detection technologies.   
The fourth component of the insider trading law variable indicates whether insider 
trading is a criminal offense.  The variable criminal takes the value one if violation of the 
insider trading law is a criminal offense, and zero otherwise.  The potential for criminal 
penalties reduces potential violators’ incentive to violate the law, holding constant the 
                                                 
21 See Table 1  
22 See Table 1. 
23 When the probability of detection is very low, the monetary penalty must be set higher for efficient 
deterrence.  See Easterbrook, 1983, pp. 292-297. 
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probability of detection and monetary damages.  When the likelihood of detection is very 
low, the optimal monetary penalty is likely to be greater than the violator’s net wealth.  
As a result, criminal prosecution potentially leading to imprisonment and other harsh 
sanctions might lead to optimal deterrence (Easterbrook, 1985).  By making it a criminal 
offense, the government might be signaling that insider trading will not be taken lightly 
in the jurisdiction in question. 24  Insider trading is considered a criminal offense in several 
jurisdictions.25 
The fifth component of the insider trading law variable addresses whether the law 
grants “injured” parties a private right of action. 26  The variable private right equals one if 
such a right is granted, and zero otherwise.  A private right of action gives particular 
investors (usually those who traded contemporaneously with the insider) or the 
corporation access to the courts to sue insiders for trading on inside information.  For 
example, some jurisdictions give individual investors the right to sue for monetary 
compensation for their alleged trading losses due to their having traded at the opposite 
                                                 
24 Criminal sanctions might also have the opposite effect, however, since in most jurisdictions criminal 
prosecution requires a higher standard of proof.  A higher burden of proof reduces the probability of 
success of prosecution, other things equal.   
25 See Table 1. 
26 There is considerable debate in the United States about whether individual investors are harmed by 
insider trading in public stock markets.  Both Carney (1987) and Wang (1981) argue that it is 
practically impossible to identify individuals or groups harmed by insider trading, since the cost of 
trading against better informed insiders is distributed across all investors.  Nevertheless, in the U.S. “it 
has long been clear that persons who traded contemporaneously with an inside trader have a private 
right of action.” (Bainbridge, 1999, p. 123).   
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end of an insider transaction.  Private rights of action give private parties an incentive to 
enforce insider trading laws independently of any remedial action taken by the relevant 
regulatory authority(ies).27  Therefore, controlling for factors like the reliability and 
efficiency of the court system, the availability of a private right of action possibly makes 
the law more effective by giving private parties an incentive to enforce it.28 
The insider trading law index, ITL, is the sum of tippee, tipping, damages, 
criminal, and private right.  Therefore, ITL takes a value from zero to five.  Zero 
represents the most lax insider trading regime and five represents the toughest insider 
trading regime.  In addition, I consider separately the potential sanctions for violating the 
law.  The variable Sanction is the sum of damages and criminal.   Information on when a 
country first enacted its insider trading law as well as the year of the first enforcement 
comes from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002).  From the latter information, I construct a 
dummy variable, Enforced, that equals one if the law has been enforced at least once by 
1994, and zero otherwise. 
Ownership data come from LLSV (1998).  They define ownership concentration 
as the average ownership concentration of the three largest shareholders in the ten largest 
private non-financial firms in the economy.  I use this variable to construct a measure of 
outside ownership, which I define as one minus LLSV’s (1998) ownership concentration 
                                                 
27 However, Dooley (1980) argues that in reality U.S. private insider trading suits almost always follow 
public proceedings. 
28 Of course, there is potential for abuse and inefficient use of private rights of action, but this does not 
change the analysis.  It merely goes to the issue of the optimal level of regulation, which is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
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measure.  By this definition, outside ownership is the average share owned by all 
shareholders except the three largest shareholders in the ten largest private non-financial 
firms in the economy.  As a measure of stock price informativeness, I use Morck, Yeung, 
and Yu’s (2000) measure of stock price synchronicity, which measures the degree to 
which stock prices moved together in an average week in 1995. The more stock prices 
move together, the higher the degree of synchronicity.  Greater synchronicity implies that 
a larger proportion of stock price movements (return variation) is explained by market-
wide than by firm-specific factors, making stock prices less informative.  Stock market 
turnover, a common measure of liquidity, is calculated as the ratio of the total value 
traded to total stock market capitalization in 1995.  Turnover data come from the 
International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (1996).   
For measures of the legal and institutional environment, I rely on LLSV (1997).  I 
use their measures of aggregate antidirector rights, accounting standards, and legal origin.  
Antidirector rights and legal origins provide general measures of the quality of investor 
protection.  Accounting standards proxy for the quality of disclosure.29  The Data 
Appendix contains a detailed description of the variables used in the empirical analysis.   
B. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the countries’ insider trading laws.  Table 1 presents each of 
the five individual components (tippee, tipping, damages, criminal, and private), the 
aggregate index (ITL), Sanction, the year in which the law was enacted and the year of 
the first enforcement.  The average year of enactment is 1983, which suggests that insider 
                                                 
29 “If the company has to disclose all material information to the market in a timely manner, then there is 
simply no space in which insiders can trade.”  (Maug, 2002, p. [ ]) 
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trading regulation is a relatively recent phenomenon.  In fact, the majority of the 
countries in the sample did not have an insider trading law prior to 1988.  The United 
States was the earliest to prohibit insider trading, effectively in 1961.  The next 
prohibition did not occur until 1966, when Canada enacted its insider trading law.  As 
Table 1 shows, the overall average of the ITL index is 3.11, compared to a maximum 
score of 5 for the United States.  Table 1 also presents information on enforcement.  The 
average year of the first enforcement is 1989, roughly 6 years after the average year of 
enactment.   
Table 1 indicates that English common law countries have the most restrictive 
insider trading laws, while Scandinavian countries have the most lax insider trading laws, 
according to the criteria considered.  French and German civil law countries’ insider 
trading laws lie between these two extremes.  The French insider trading law average is 
closer to the common law average and the German insider trading law average is closer 
to the Scandinavian average.  On average, common law countries enacted and enforced 
insider trading laws earlier than civil law countries (t-statistics of differences in means 
are significant at the 15% level).30  Common law countries also tend to have more 
stringent insider trading laws than civil law countries.  The t-statistic of the difference in 
means of ITL between common law and civil law countries is significant at the 5% level.  
The main causes of this difference are greater potential sanctions (criminal charges and 
multiple damages) and a greater incidence of private rights of action in common law 
                                                 
30 However, there is no significant difference in Enforced (i.e., the proportion of countries that have 
enforced the law by 1994) between common and civil law countries. 
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countries.31  These observations are consistent with the general finding of LLSV (1997, 
1998) that common law countries are more protective of investors. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics.  Panel B presents tests of differences in 
means and medians between common and civil law countries.  Common law countries 
have significantly larger stock markets than civil law countries (t-statistic and z-statistic 
are both significant at the 15% level).  Common law countries also have better 
accounting standards than civil law countries (t-statistic is significant at the 5% level and 
z-statistic is significant at the 1% level) and greater antidirector rights (t-statistic and z-
statistic are both significant at the 1% level).  Outside ownership, turnover and stock 
price synchronicity are not significantly different between common and civil law 
countries, however. 
Table 3 presents the coefficients of correlation among the variables.  As expected, 
wealthier economies (as measured by GNP) have larger stock markets (as measured by 
market capitalization).  The correlation coefficient between the log of GNP and stock 
market capitalization is positive and significant at the 1% level.  Wealthier countries also 
have a higher fraction of outside ownership.  The coefficient of correlation between the 
log of GNP and outside ownership is positive and significant at the 1% level.  In addition, 
wealthy countries have both more liquid markets (the correlation coefficient between 
turnover and the log of GNP is positive and significant at the 1% level) and more 
                                                 
31 I am grateful to Professor Merritt Fox for pointing out to me that there is a potential omitted variable 
problem related to private rights of action in that “countries that have a private right of action to 
support rules against insider trading probably have a quite different kind of legal system in other 
broader regards.”  I hope that by controlling for the legal system in the regressions, I am able to allay 
this concern somewhat. 
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informative stock prices (the correlation coefficient between stock price synchronicity 
and the log of GNP is negative and significant at the 1% level).   
Stronger investor protections, in the form of greater antidirector rights, do not 
appear to be features unique to wealthy countries.  In contrast, the correlation coefficient 
between the sanction measure of insider trading law and the log of GNP is positive and 
significant at the 5% level.  That is, wealthy countries tend to have tougher insider 
trading sanctions.  Countries that provide greater minority protections (antidirector rights) 
also tend to have more stringent insider trading rules.   
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, outside ownership is positively and significantly 
correlated with both ITL and Sanction at the 1% level of significance.  Outside ownership 
is also positively and significantly correlated with antidirector rights and accounting 
standards at the 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  Insider trading law (both 
ITL and Sanction) is negatively and significantly correlated with stock price 
synchronicity at the 5% level.  Consistent with Hypothesis 2, this means that prices tend 
to reflect more firm-specific information in countries with more stringent insider trading 
laws.  Finally, stock market turnover is positively and significantly correlated with insider 
trading law (however, only the ITL measure) at the 15% level, consistent with 
Hypotheses 3. 
V. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
A. Agency Costs, Ownership Structure, and Insider Trading Law 
Hypothesis 1 implies that, other things equal, countries with tougher insider 
trading laws have greater outside ownership, where ownership concentration is a proxy 
for agency costs.  In this section, I present the results of regressions of outside ownership 
on the insider trading law variables and legal origin.  
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Table 4 presents the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in 
which the dependent variable is outside ownership.  Each regression in Table 4 confirms 
the finding of LLSV (1997) that French civil law origin is associated with lower outside 
ownership (i.e., greater ownership concentration).32  In an unreported regression, I also 
confirm the finding of LLSV (1998) that ownership concentration is negatively and 
significantly associated with antidirector rights.33  The coefficient on the antidirector 
rights index is positive and significant at the 1% level.  Accounting standards is never 
significant beyond the 20% level and the coefficient is very small.34   
Column 2 includes the insider trading law index (ITL) and the legal origin 
variables.  The coefficient on the index of insider trading law is positive (.04) and 
significant at the 5% level. 35  Other things equal, this implies that an increase in the 
insider trading law score from the Scandinavian civil law average of 2.5 to the English 
common law average of 3.5 is associated with an increase of 4 percentage points in 
outside ownership (or about 7% of the civil law average outside ownership of .55).  In 
column 3, the coefficient on Sanction is .09 and it is significant at the 1% level.  The 
                                                 
32 The coefficients on the legal origin variables are relative to English common law origin, the omitted 
dummy variable. 
33 The coefficient on antidirector rights is of roughly the same order of magnitude as in LLSV (1997), 
despite the fact that the sample of countries in this article is slightly smaller than theirs. 
34 The regressions in Table 4 exclude the accounting standards variable, since the results are the same 
with or without it.   
35 The magnitude of this coefficient is comparable to that on the antidirector rights index when the latter 
is substituted for the insider trading law index. 
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coefficient Enforced is about .10 and it is significant at the 1% level (column 4).  This 
implies that a switch from a regime in which insider trading law has not been enforced as 
of 1994 to one in which it has results in an impressive 10 percentage point rise in outside 
ownership, other things equal.  In columns 5 and 6, I include the insider trading law 
measures (ITL and Sanction, respectively) together with enforcement.  The results are 
roughly similar to those that result when I include each of the variables separately with 
legal origin.  Columns 7 and 8 report regressions that include the two interaction terms, 
ITL times Enforced (i.e., Effective Law) and Sanction times Enforced (i.e., Effective 
Sanction), respectively.  Both coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% level. 
In column 9, I include each of the individual components of the insider trading 
law index separately.  The results suggest that the possibility of criminal punishment is 
the main factor underlying the results for the aggregate index, ITL.  The coefficient on 
criminal is .09 and it is significant at the 1% level.  Enforcement remains positive and 
significant at the 5% level.  A linear combination of the (insider trading law and 
enforcement) coefficients yields an estimate of .24 that is significant at the 1% level.  
This suggests that a simultaneous move from an insider trading law index (ITL) of 0 to a 
score of 5 and from no enforcement to enforcement results in a rise in outside ownership 
of 24 percentage points, other things equal.   
Finally, when I include antidirector rights in regressions (unreported) along with 
the insider trading law variables, the coefficients on both the antidirector rights index and 
the insider trading law measures fall in magnitude, but remain significant.  In all of these 
regressions, the coefficients on the insider trading law measures are larger than that on 
antidirector rights. 
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It is possible that insider trading legislation is endogenous to ownership 
concentration. For instance, insider trading laws might be more lax in countries in which 
ownership is more concentrated because, as I argue in Beny (2001), there might be fewer 
opportunities for profitable insider trading in firms with concentrated ownership.  
Alternatively, as I argue in Beny (2002), insiders might constitute a more formidable 
lobby against insider trading legislation and enforcement in economies dominated by 
corporate insiders (i.e., in economies in which ownership is highly concentrated).  
Another possibility is that, in countries in which corporate ownership is highly 
concentrated, the stock market is relatively unimportant to the real economy and thus the 
government makes little effort to control insider trading. 36  That is, ensuring price 
accuracy and liquidity are not major public concerns, since the stock market is of little 
significance to capital allocation and the real economy. 
To address this concern, I use legal origin as an instrument for the insider trading 
law measures.  LLSV (1998) argue that legal origin is exogenous to the financial system 
and demonstrate that ownership structure is correlated with legal origin.  Table 5 reports 
the results of instrumental variables regressions of outside ownership on the insider 
trading law variables.  In regressions 1, 2, 6 and 7, the p-values of Hausman specification 
tests indicate that the coefficients on the insider trading law variables are not significantly 
different from the corresponding OLS estimates reported in Table 4.  However, the 
estimates in regressions 3-5 are significantly different from the corresponding OLS 
regressions.  The coefficient on Enforced in columns 3-5 is about .32 and it is significant 
at the 1% level in each of these regressions.  This means that, other things equal, an 
                                                 
36 I am grateful to Merritt Fox for sharing this insight with me. 
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increase from the civil law median enforcement measure of 0 to the common law median 
enforcement measure of 1 is associated with a 30 percentage point increase in outside 
ownership, other things equal. 
The results in Tables  4 are consistent with Hypothesis 1, which predicts that 
more stringent insider trading laws are associated with more outside ownership because 
they reduce the probability of expropriation by insiders.  The most statistically important 
elements of the insider trading index in these regressions are the potential for criminal 
prosecution and the incidence of enforcement.  When I address the potential endogeneity 
between ownership concentration and insider trading law in Table 5, the findings of 
Table 4 are largely unchanged. 
B. Stock Price Informativeness and Insider Trading Law 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that more firm-specific information is impounded into 
stock prices in markets with more stringent insider trading laws, other things equal. 
Table 6 reports regressions in which the dependent variable is stock price  
synchronicity, the proportion of stocks moving in the same direction in an average week 
in 1995 (Morck, Yeung and Yu, 2000).  In all of the regressions in Table 6, the 
coefficient on the log of GNP is negative and significant, consistent with Morck, Yeung 
and Yu (2000).  Also consistent with Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000), stock prices are less 
synchronous (i.e., contain more firm-specific information) in economies with a higher 
antidirector rights score, controlling for legal origin.  
In column 2, the coefficient on the antidirector rights index is negative (-1.05) and 
significant at the 15% level. In column 3, the coefficient on the insider trading law index, 
ITL, is negative (-1.45) and significant at the 5% level.  This result suggests that an 
increase in the insider trading law index from Mexico’s score of 1 to the U.S. score of 5, 
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for example, results in a 5.8 percentage point decrease in stock price synchronicity, other 
things equal.  In column 4, the coefficient on Sanction is -2.39 and it is significant at the 
5% level.  Thus, an increase in the sanction score from the civil law mean of .87 to the 
common law mean of 1.15 is associated with about a .70 percentage point drop in 
synchronicity, other things equal.  The coefficient on Enforced is insignificant in 
regressions 5-7.  The interaction terms in columns 8 and 9 are also insignificant.   
In column 10, I include each of the individual components of ins ider trading law 
separately.  The tippee liability and the possibility of multiple damages components of 
the IT index appear to underlie the result for the aggregate index.  The tippee variable is 
significant at the 10% level and damages is significant at the 20% level  The remaining 
components are insignificant.  A linear combination of the individual insider trading law 
and enforcement coefficients yields an estimate of –7.56 that is significant at the 5% 
level.  This suggests that a simultaneous move from an insider trading law index (ITL) of 
0 to a score of 5 and from no enforcement to enforcement is associated with a –7.56 point 
drop in the percentage of stock prices moving together, other things equal.  
I run the same regressions as in Table 6 (columns 3-10) with the antidirector 
rights index.  This does not qualitatively change the results, although it does slightly 
lower the coefficients on the insider trading law measures as well as on the antidirector 
rights index and, in a few instances, the antidirector rights measure becomes less 
significant.37  I also run the regressions in Table 6 with the accounting standards measure. 
The coefficient on accounting standards is positive and significant in all regression 
                                                 
37 A possible explanation is that the insider trading law measures and the antidirector rights index are 
highly correlated.  
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specifications.  This result seems counterintuitive, since one would expect better 
disclosure to be associated with a greater degree of firm-specific information reflected in 
stock prices (i.e., less synchronous stock prices).38  I do not report these regressions, since 
they do not qualitatively change the results. 
The results in Table 6 are generally consistent with Hypothesis 2, which predicts that 
tougher insider trading laws are associated with more informative stock prices.  This 
finding is consistent with the argument that a more level playing field between insiders 
and arbitrage traders leads to greater stock price accuracy (see, e.g., Georgakopoulos, 
1993; Goshen and Parchomovsky, 2001).  The most statistically important elements of 
the law in these regressions are tippee liability and the possibility of multiple damages, 
although the latter result is rather weak. 
C. Stock Market Liquidity and Insider Trading Law 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that countries with more stringent insider trading laws have 
more liquid equity markets, other things equal.  In this section, I present the results of 
regressions of stock market turnover on the insider trading law variables and legal origin.  
The dependent variable is the log of the turnover ratio.  Table 7 reports the results.   
In columns 1-9, the coefficients on each of the civil law origins, French, German 
and Scandinavian, are positive and significant.  In addition, the coefficient on the 
accounting standards variable is positive and significant in all of the regressions.  This 
result is consistent with the notion that transparency is important for promoting liquid 
                                                 
38 This rather counterintuitive result might be explained by the fact that the accounting standards index is 
a poor proxy for the legal disclosure regime. 
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markets (Pagano and Roell, 1996).  The coefficient on the antidirector rights index is 
insignificant and, since there is no obvious theoretical reason why antidirector rights 
should directly affect liquidity, I do not report it in Table 7. 
In column 2, the coefficient on the index of insider trading law is positive (0.19) 
and significant at the 15% level.  This implies that a simultaneous move from a country 
with an aggregate insider trading law score (ITL) of 3 (e.g., Argentina) to a country with 
an aggregate score of 4 (e.g., Singapore) results in about a 20% increase in the turnover 
ratio.  The coefficient on Enforced is never significant (columns 4-6).  In column 6, the 
coefficient on Sanction is positive (.05) but it is only weakly significant at the 20% level.  
The coefficient on the interaction term Effective Law (ITL times Enforced) is insignificant 
in column 7.  In column 8, the coefficient on the interaction term Effective Sanction 
(Sanction times Enforced) is positive but it is significant at only the 20% level. 
Finally, in column 9, I include each of the individual components of the aggregate 
insider trading law variable (ITL) separately.  The results in column 9 suggest that the 
most important component is the ban on tipping outsiders.  The coefficient on tipping is 
positive (.93) and significant at the 10% level.  A linear combination of the coefficients 
yields an estimate of 1.28 that is significant at the 10% level.  This implies that moving 
from an insider trading index of 0 to a score of 5 and from no enforcement to 
enforcement is associated with more than a doubling of the turnover ratio. 
When I run the same set of regressions without the accounting standards variable, 
the results are largely similar.  The only significant differences are that the coefficient on 
the aggregate insider trading law index (ITL) becomes slightly larger and more significant 
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and the coefficient on Effective Sanction increases slightly in magnitude and becomes 
significant, whereas it is insignificant when it is included alongside accounting standards. 
As a robustness check of the significance of insider trading law and enforcement 
to liquidity, I run random effects regressions on panel (cross-section and time series) data 
in which the independent variable is the log of the turnover ratio.  The data used in these 
regressions come from Beny (2002) and are described in the notes accompanying Table 
8.  In these regressions, there are two insider trading law measures: a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the country has an insider trading law (and 0 otherwise) and another 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the country has enforced the law at least once in the 
history of its stock market (and zero otherwise).  The results, reported in Table 8, show 
that both the existence and enforcement of insider trading legislation are positively and 
significantly associated with stock market turnover.  These results are consistent with 
those of Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), and suggest that both insider trading legislation 
and enforcement are associated with more liquid stock markets. 
It is possible that insider trading legislation and enforcement are endogenous to 
stock market liquidity.  In Beny (2002), I argue that the (private and public) demand for 
insider trading legislation and enforcement rises as the stock market becomes more 
liquid.  As a result, regressing liquidity on the insider trading law and enforcement 
measures could bias the results.  Therefore, I run instrumental variables regressions of the 
log of the turnover ratio on insider trading law and enforcement, using the exogenous 
(LLSV, 1998) legal origin variables as instruments for insider trading law and 
enforcement.  The results are presented in Table 9 and the data are described in the 
accompanying notes.  In column 1, the coefficient on the insider trading law indicator is 
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an impressive 2.6 and it is significant at the 5% level.  However, the coefficient on the 
enforcement indicator is insignificant in columns 2 and 3, consis tent with the results in 
Table 7.   
Overall, the results in Tables 7-9 are consistent with Hypothesis 3, which predicts 
that tougher insider trading laws are associated with more liquid stock markets.  The 
single most statistically important element of the law is the prohibition against corporate 
insiders’ tipping outsiders.  Enforcement, inexplicably, is insignificant. 
D. Summary and Discussion of Results 
The empirical tests yield three general results.  The first result is that large public 
corporations tend to have greater outside ownership (less concentrated ownership) in 
countries with tougher insider trading laws and enforcement, consistent with 
Hypothesis 1.  Outside ownership is especially positively and significantly associated 
with the potential sanctions for violating the insider trading laws and with enforcement.39  
Since concentrated ownership is an important mechanism by which firms address agency 
problems, this result supports legal and economic theories that characterize insider 
trading an as agency cost.   
The ownership results warrant further discussion, however.  Demsetz (1986) and 
Bhide (1993) suggest that lax insider trading rules reduce rather than increase agency 
costs, since they encourage active shareholding.  Large shareholders engage in valuable 
corporate monitoring if they have adequate incentives to bear the risk of concentrated 
                                                 
39 It makes sense that the potential sanctions for violating the law are pivotal, since the deterrent effect of 
the law depends importantly on the potential punishment.  Greater sanctions raise the cost of 
transgressing the insider trading ban. 
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shareholding (Demsetz, 1986; Bhide, 1993).  Insider trading profits are one means by 
which large shareholders are compensated for valuable monitoring (Demsetz, 1986).  
This logic implies that my finding of a positive association between insider trading laws 
and enforcement and outside ownership might equally support the claim that insider 
trading laws exacerbate agency costs, by “impair[ing] governance by encouraging diffuse 
stockholding and discouraging active investing.”  (Bhide, 1993, p. 43; Demsetz, 1986).  
However, in Beny (2001), I present evidence that insider trading laws are positively 
associated with valuation even in firms in which ownership tends to be concentrated.  
The second result is that stock prices tend to be less synchronous (i.e., contain 
more firm-specific information) in countries with more stringent insider trading laws, 
consistent with Hypothesis 2.  This finding is also consistent with the claim of proponents 
of insider trading legislation that insider trading is detrimental to price accuracy because 
it both discourages arbitrage traders either by increasing the risk of expropriation or by 
stifling competition in the market for information and increases insiders’ incentives to 
manipulate information disclosure.  On the other hand, it contradicts the claim of 
opponents of insider trading legislation that insider trading is an effective and less costly 
alternative to traditional disclosure.   
There is a potential omitted variable problem in the syncrhonicity regressions, 
however.  In particular, countries with strong insider trading rules and enforcement 
regimes probably also tend to have more stringent disclosure regimes.  As a result, the 
regressions might be capturing this effect, rather than the effect of insider trading rules 
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per se.40  Unfortunately, I do not have a satisfactory empirical proxy for the quality of 
disclosure rules.  The accounting standards measure is the best available proxy at the 
moment.  Yet, as the synchronicity regressions show, it yields counterintuitive results. 
The third result is that countries with tougher insider trading laws tend to have 
more liquid stock markets, consistent with Hypothesis 3.  This finding is also consistent 
with theoretical and empirical research in market microstructure that demonstrates the 
detrimental effect of information asymmetry on trading costs and with the notion that 
insiders’ informational monopoly harms liquidity (increases transaction costs) by 
reducing competition among informed traders.  It therefore supports those who advocate 
insider trading regulation on the ground that it promotes liquid stock markets. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The finding of a positive association between outside ownership and insider 
trading law and enforcement suggests that insider trading legislation might ameliorate the 
potential agency costs of insider trading.  However, this conclusion is somewhat tenuous, 
since concentrated ownership could also mitigate agency costs, and insider trading profits 
might be the means to encourage active monitoring by large shareholders (Demsetz, 
1986; Bhide, 1993).  I provide more direct evidence on the agency implications of insider 
trading legislation in Beny (2001), where I empirically examine the relationship between 
insider trading legislation and corporate valuation at the firm level for both widely held 
firms and firms with a controlling owner. 
                                                 
40 For example, Durnev, Fox, Morck, and Yeung (2003) show empirically that mandatory disclosure 
increases share price accuracy. 
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Even if insider trading legislation does not directly alleviate corporate agency 
costs,41 however, the empirical results of this article suggest that such legislation might 
generate positive market externalities.  In particular, the finding that more stringent 
insider trading laws are associated with more liquid stock markets and more informative 
stock prices supports those who advocate insider trading legislation in the interest of 
promoting economic efficiency.   More liquid markets and more accurate stock prices 
reduce the cost of equity capital and improve the efficiency of capital allocation, 
respectively (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Wurgler, 2000).  Private parties are unlikely 
to give adequate consideration to these external benefits, thus strengthening the case for 
public regulation (Shleifer and Johnson, 1999; Goshen and Parchomovsky, 2001). 
Furthermore, to the extent that insider trading legislation encourages more 
accurate stock prices and greater stock market liquidity, indirectly it might also 
ameliorate corporate agency problems.  More accurate stock prices improve corporate 
governance.42  So too does greater liquidity, particularly by facilitating the market for 
corporate control.43  In contrast, less accurate prices and lower liquidity reduce 
                                                 
41 However, the evidence presented in Beny (2001) suggests that insider trading legislation and 
enforcement do alleviate agency costs, particularly for firms in which ownership and control are 
separated.  In that study, I find a positive and statistically significant association between corporate 
valuation and insider trading law and enforcement among firms that are widely held. 
42 The rich literature on mandatory securities disclosure enumerates several economic benefits of 
accurate stock prices, including their role in improving corporate governance and reducing agency 
costs.  See Fox (1999), for example.   
43 Maug (1998) shows that liquid stock markets are beneficial because they improve corporate 
governance by improving large shareholders’ incentives to monitor. 
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shareholders’ incentives to monitor and hence increase corporate insiders’ ability and 
incentives to expropriate outside investors (Fox, 1999; Maug, 1998). 
Some of the findings of this article (e.g., the finding that stronger insider trading 
rules are positively associated with price accuracy) might be explained by the fact that 
stringent insider trading rules tend to coincide with strict disclosure rules.  This article 
does not address disclosure rules directly.  Future research should do so, however, 
particularly regarding the interaction between disclosure rules and insider trading laws.  
Such work should empirically assess the complementarity (or substitutability) of insider 
trading laws and disclosure rules.  There is already an emerging theoretical literature 
highlighting the relationship between these two sets of market regulations.44  In addition, 
lawmakers have long noted the connection between disclosure and insider trading rules.  
Indeed, an important pillar of U.S. insider trading legislation is the “disclose or abstain” 
rule, which requires that insiders either disclose material nonpublic information or refrain 
from trading on the basis of such information.  I defer this issue to future research.  
                                                 
44 Shin (1996) shows theoretically that some restriction of insider trading combined with minimal 
disclosure requirements is the optimal approach to regulating insider trading.  Baiman and Verrechia 
(1996) show that greater voluntary disclosure redues the extent of insider trading in a firm’s shares.  
Fried (1997) argues that a rule that would require insiders to disclose their identities and intentions to 
trade prior to trading would reduce considerably (and perhaps even eliminate) insider trading profits. 
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Data Appendix 
Log of Gross National Product (GNP) 
Logarithm of Gross National Product in 1994.  Source: World Bank, World Development Report 
(1996). 
Growth of per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Average annual percentage growth rate of per capita GDP for the years 1970-1993.  Source: 
World Bank, World Development Report (1995). 
Stock market capitalization 
Total value of the country’s public equity market in 1995.  Source: International Finance 
Corporation, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (1996). 
Outside ownership 
One minus the average fraction “of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in 
the ten largest non-financial domestic firms” in the country.  Source: LLSV (1998).  Primary 
sources: Moody’s International, CIFAR, EXTEL, WorldScope, 20-F Forms, Price Waterhouse, 
and various country sources. 
Stock price synchronicity 
The fraction of stocks whose prices moved in the same direction in an average week in 1995.  
Source: Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000). 
Stock market turnover 
The total value traded divided by stock market capitalization in 1995.  Source: International 
Finance Corporation, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (1996). 
Legal origin 
An indicator variable that signifies the legal origin of the country’s Company Law or 
Commercial Code.  The variable equals 1 if the legal origin is English common law; 2 if it is the 
French civil law; 3 if it is the German civil law; and 4 if the origin is the Scandinavian civil law.  
Source: LLSV (1998).  Primary source: Flores and Reynolds (1989). 
Accounting standards  
The accounting standards index assigns a rating to companies’ 1990 annual reports on the basis 
of their inclusion or exclusion of 90 items.  The 90 items are divided into 7 categories (general 
information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, 
stock data and special items).  For each country, the index is based on examination of a 
minimum of 3 companies.  These companies come from a cross-section of various industries.  
Seventy percent are industrial companies, while the remaining thirty percent are financial 
companies.  Source: LLSV (1998).  Primary source: Center for International Financial Analysis, 
International Accounting and Auditing Trends.  
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Antidirector rights index 
The antidirector rights index aggregates various shareholder rights.  The index is created by 
adding 1 if: “(1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders are 
not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting; (3) cumulative 
voting is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; or (5) when the minimum 
percentage of share capital that entitles are shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ 
Meeting is less than or equal to 10% (sample median).  The index ranges from 0 to 5.”  Source: 
LLSV (1997).  Primary sources: Countries’ company laws or commercial codes. 
Insider trading law (ITL) 
An index aggregating individual components of countries’ insider trading laws.  The index is 
constructed by adding 1 if: (1) tippees, like primary insiders, are prohibited from trading on 
material non-public information; (2) insiders are prohibited from tipping outsiders about material 
non-public information and/or encouraging them to trade on such information for personal gain; 
(3) monetary penalties are proportional to insiders’ trading profits; (4) investors have a private 
right of action; or (5) violation of the insider trading law is a criminal offense.  The index ranges 
from 0 to 5, with 0 representing the most lax insider trading regime and 5 representing the 
toughest insider trading regime.  Sources: Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996). 
Sanctions (Sanction) 
Sanction is constructed by adding 1 if: (1) monetary penalties are proportional to insiders’ 
trading profits; (2) violation of the insider trading law is a criminal offense; or (3) investors have 
a private right of action.  The index equals 0 to 3, with 0 representing the most lenient potential 
legal sanctions and 3 representing the most stringent potential sanctions.  Sources: Gaillard 
(1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996). 
Enforcement of Insider Trading Law (Enforced) 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the country’s insider trading law has been enforced for the 
first time (i.e., at least once) by the end of 1994.  Source: Bhattacharya and Daouk (2000).  
Primary Sources: national stock markets and regulators. 
Effective law (Effective Law) 
Insider Trading Law (ITL) Index times Enforcement (Enforced) 
Effective sanction (Effective Sanction) 
Insider Trading Sanctions (Sanction) times Enforcement (Enforced) 
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Table 1 
Insider Trading Laws and Enforcement 
Country 
 
(1) 
Year of Law 
 
(2) 
Tippee 
 
(3) 
Tipping 
 
(4) 
Damages 
 
(5) 
Criminal 
 
(6) 
Private Right 
 
(7) 
ITL 
 
(8) 
Sanction 
 
(9) 
First Enforced 
 
(10) 
Common Law          
Australia 1991 1 1 0 1 1 4 1 1996 
Canada 1966 1 1 1 1 1 5 2 1976 
Hong Kong 1991 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 1994 
India 1992 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 1998 
Ireland 1990 1 1 0 1 1 4 1 - 
Israel 1981 0 1 0 1 1 3 1 1989 
Malaysia 1973 0 1 0 1 1 3 1 1996 
New Zealand 1988 1 1 1 0 1 4 1 - 
Singapore 1973 1 1 0 1 1 4 1 1978 
South Africa 1989 1 0 0 1 1 3 1 - 
Thailand 1984 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1993 
UK 1980 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1981 
USA 1934 1 1 1 1 1 5 2 1961 
          
Common Law Average 1979 0.77 0.92 0.31 0.85 0.70 3.54 1.15 1986 
          
Common Law Median 1984 1 1 0 1 1 3 1 1991 
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Table 1 
Insider Trading Laws and Enforcement (Continued) 
Country 
 
(1) 
Year of Law 
 
(2) 
Tippee 
 
(3) 
Tipping 
 
(4) 
Damages 
 
(5) 
Criminal 
 
(6) 
Private Right 
 
(7) 
ITL 
 
(8) 
Sanction 
 
(9) 
First Enforced 
 
(10) 
          
French Civil Law          
Argentina 1991 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 1995 
Belgium 1990 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1994 
Brazil 1976 1 1 0 0 1 3 0 1978 
France 1967 1 1 1 1 0 4 2 1975 
Greece 1988 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 1996 
Indonesia 1991 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 1996 
Italy 1991 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1996 
Mexico 1975 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 - 
Netherlands 1989 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1994 
Philippines 1982 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 - 
Portugal 1986 1 1 0 1 1 4 1 - 
Spain 1994 1 1 1 0 1 4 1 1998 
          
French Civil Law Average 1985 0.83 0.92 0.25 0.58 0.25 2.83 0.83 1991 
          
French Civil Law Median 1988 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1995 
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Table 1 
Insider Trading Laws and Enforcement (Continued) 
Country 
 
(1) 
Year of Law 
 
(2) 
Tippee 
 
(3) 
Tipping 
 
(4) 
Damages 
 
(5) 
Criminal 
 
(6) 
Private Right 
 
(7) 
ITL 
 
(8) 
Sanction 
 
(9) 
First Enforced 
 
(10) 
German Civil Law          
Austria 1993 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 - 
Germany 1994 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1995 
Japan 1988 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 1990 
Luxembourg 1991 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 - 
South Korea 1976 1 1 1 1 1 5 2 1988 
Switzerland 1988 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1995 
Taiwan 1988 1 1 0 1 1 4 1 1989 
          
German Civil Law Average 1988 1 0.86 0.14 0.86 0.29 3.14 0.58 1991 
          
German Civil Law Median 1988 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1990 
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Table 1 
Insider Trading Laws and Enforcement (Continued) 
Country 
 
(1) 
Year of Law 
 
(2) 
Tippee 
 
(3) 
Tipping 
 
(4) 
Damages 
 
(5) 
Criminal 
 
(6) 
Private Right 
 
(7) 
ITL 
 
(8) 
Sanction 
 
(9) 
First Enforced 
 
(10) 
          
Scandinavian Civil Law          
Denmark 1991 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1996 
Finland 1989 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1993 
Norway 1985 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1990 
Sweden 1971 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1990 
          
Scandinavian Civil Law Average 1984 1 0.75 0 0.75 0 2.50 0.75 1992 
          
Scandinavian Civil Law Median 1987 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1991 
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Table 1 
Insider Trading Laws and Enforcement (Continued) 
Country 
 
(1) 
Year of Law 
 
(2) 
Tippee 
 
(3) 
Tipping 
 
(4) 
Damages 
 
(5) 
Criminal 
 
(6) 
Private Right  
 
(7) 
ITL 
 
(8) 
Sanction 
 
(9) 
First Enforced 
 
(10) 
          
Civil Law Average 1986 0.91 0.87 0.17 0.70 0.22 2.87 0.87 1991 
Civil Law Median 1988 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1994 
          
Overall Average 1983 0.86 0.89 0.22 0.75 0.39 3.11 0.97 1989 
          
Overall Median 1988 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1993 
t-test of means 
(Common vs. Civil Law) -1.65d -1.19 0.48 0.91 0.99 3.09a 2.05b 1.66c -1.57d 
z-test of medians  
(Common Law vs. Civil Law) -1.23 -1.18 0.48 0.91 0.99 2.77a 1.93b 1.63c -0.87 
 
Notes: “Year of Law” is the year in which the country passed an insider trading law.  Tippee equals one if tippees are prohibited from trading on 
material non-public information, and zero otherwise.  Tipping equals one if insiders are prohibited from tipping outsiders about material non-
public information, and zero otherwise.  Criminal equals one if insider trading is a criminal offense, and zero otherwise.  Private right equals 
one if investors have a private right of action against insiders who violate the insider trading laws, and zero otherwise.  Damages equals one if 
potential damages are a multiple of the alleged insider trading profits, and zero otherwise.  ITL, the aggregate insider trading law index,  is the 
sum of columns 3 – 7 (tippee, tipping, criminal, private right, and damages).  Sanction is the sum of columns 5 and 6 (criminal and damages).  
“First Enforcement” is the year in which the country first enforced its insider trading laws.  All variables are described in detail in the Data 
Appendix. 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
Panel A 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Median Minimum Maximum Observations 
       
All Countries        
Log of GNP 12.38 1.25 12.29 10.44 15.67 35 
GDP Growth 3.82 2.49 3.06 0.30 11.56 35 
Log of Stock Market Capitalization 11.93 1.42 11.91 9.67 15.74 33 
Outside Ownership 0.56 0.14 0.52 0.33 0.82 35 
Turnover 55.94 45.44 43.20 0.70 211.40 37 
Stock Price Synchronicity 66.20 4.28 66.60 57.90 76.30 32 
Accounting Standards 65.24 9.75 65.00 36.00 83.00 33 
Antidirector Rights 2.57 1.27 3.00 0.00 5.00 35 
Common Law Countries       
Log of GNP 12.11 1.46 11.68 10.69 15.67 13 
GDP Growth 4.42 2.27 4.25 1.67 7.70 13 
Log of Stock Market Capitalization 12.57 1.42 12.41 10.16 15.74 11 
Outside Ownership 0.58 0.12 0.53 0.46 0.81 11 
Turnover 41.92 22.78 41.40 6.50 85.7 13 
Stock Price Synchronicity 65.67 5.01 66.45 57.90 75.40 12 
Accounting Standards 70.50 6.36 70.50 57 78 12 
Antidirector Rights 3.54 0.78 4.00 2.00 5.00 13 
Civil Law Countries       
Log of GNP 12.53 1.12 12.37 10.44 15.18 22 
GDP Growth 3.46 2.60 2.67 0.30 11.56 22 
Log of Stock Market Capitalization 11.76 1.31 11.73 9.74 15.11 20 
Outside Ownership 0.55 0.15 0.51 0.33 0.82 22 
Turnover 61.26 52.78 45.20 0.70 211.40 23 
Stock Price Synchronicity 66.52 3.88 66.60 59.20 76.30 20 
Accounting Standards 62.24 10.19 62.00 36.00 83.00 21 
Antidirector Rights 2.00 1.15 2.00 0.00 4.00 22 
 
Note: All variables are described in detail in the Data Appendix.  
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics (Continued) 
Panel B:  Tests of Means and Medians  
Variable 
t-test of means 
(common vs. civil law) 
z-test of medians 
(common vs. civil law) 
   
Log of GNP -0.97 -1.37 
GDP Growth 1.10 1.52d 
Log of Stock Market Capitalization 1.60d 1.57d 
Outside Ownership 0.76 0.94 
Turnover -0.125 -0.74 
Stock Price Synchronicity -0.54 -0.35 
Accounting Standards 2.53b 2.66a 
Antidirector Rights 4.26a 3.63a 
 
Note: All variables are described in detail in the Data Appendix. 
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Table 3 
Simple Correlations  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Log of GNP (1) 
 
1.00            
GDP Growth (2) -0.12 
(0.50) 
1.00           
Stock Market Capitalization (3) 0.68a 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
(0.69) 
1.00          
Outside Ownership (4) 0.47a 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.27) 
0.54a 
(0.00) 
1.00         
Turnover (5) 0.45a 
(0.01) 
0.17 
(0.34) 
0.14 
(0.46) 
0.42a 
(0.01) 
1.00        
Stock Price Synchronicity (6) -0.46a 
(0.01) 
0.50a 
(0.00) 
-0.39b 
(0.04) 
-0.18 
(0.31) 
-0.14 
(0.45) 
1.00       
Accounting Standards (7) 0.04 
(0.82) 
-0.00 
(1.00) 
0.15 
(0.43) 
0.45a 
(0.01) 
0.13 
(0.46) 
0.03 
(0.87) 
1.00      
Antidirector Rights (8) -0.09 
(0.62) 
0.12 
(0.48) 
0.40b 
(0.03) 
0.36b 
(0.04) 
-0.13 
(0.46) 
-0.22 
(0.23) 
0.29d 
(0.11) 
1.00     
Civil Law Origin (9) 0.17 
(0.34) 
-0.19 
(0.28) 
-0.21 
(0.27) 
-0.13 
(0.45) 
0.21 
(0.22) 
0.10 
(0.59) 
-0.41b 
(0.02) 
-0.60a 
(0.00) 
1.00    
Insider Trading Law (10) 0.20 
(0.24) 
0.17 
(0.33) 
0.26 
(0.17) 
0.41a 
(0.02) 
0.27d 
(0.11) 
-0.36b 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.82) 
0.34b 
(0.04) 
-0.33b 
(0.05) 
1.00   
Sanction (11) 0.34b 
(0.05) 
0.15 
(0.41) 
0.37b 
(0.04) 
0.51a 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.18) 
-0.37b 
(0.04) 
0.27d 
(0.13) 
0.30c 
(0.08) 
-0.27d 
(0.11) 
0.76a 
(0.00) 
1.00  
Enforcement (12) 0.30c 
(0.08) 
0.20 
(0.26) 
0.29d 
(0.12) 
0.59a 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.18) 
-0.17 
(0.35) 
0.46a 
(0.01) 
0.26d 
(0.13) 
-0.17 
(0.31) 
0.29c 
(0.09) 
0.28c 
(0.10) 
1.00 
 
Notes: Column 1 is Log of GNP; column 2 is GDP growth; column 3 is stock market capitalization; column 4 is outside ownership; column 5 is turnover; column 6 is stock 
price synchronicity; column 7 is accounting standards; column 8 is antidirector rights; column 9 is civil law origin; column 10 is insider trading law; column 11 is sanction; 
and column 12 is enforcement.  All variables are described in detail in the Data Appendix.  The numbers in parentheses are the probability levels (p-values) at which the null 
hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected in two-tailed tests.  The superscripts a, b, c, and d denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4 
OLS Regressions  
Outside Ownership and Insider Trading Law 
Dependent Variable:  Outside Ownership 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Log of GNP 0.055a 
(0.014) 
0.048a 
(0.015) 
0.041a 
(0.015) 
0.039a 
(0.014) 
0.036b 
(0.015) 
0.028b 
(0.015) 
0.037b 
(0.015) 
0.033b 
(0.015) 
0.034b  
(0.014) 
French Civil Law -0.139a 
(0.033) 
-0.107a 
(0.036) 
-0.104a 
(0.034) 
-0.106a 
(0.036) 
-0.086b 
(0.039) 
-0.080b 
(0.035) 
-0.106a 
(0.036) 
-0.096a 
(0.035) 
-0.069d 
(0.043) 
German Civil Law 0.012 
(0.074) 
0.035 
(0.065) 
0.042 
(0.064) 
0.041 
(0.058) 
0.055 
(0.054) 
0.064 
(0.052) 
0.045 
(0.056) 
0.045 
(0.059) 
0.056 
(0.060) 
Scandinavian Civil Law 0.068c 
(0.036) 
0.108b 
(0.047) 
0.100b 
(0.047) 
0.050d 
(0.032) 
0.083 
(0.039) 
0.080b 
(0.039) 
0.078b 
(0.032) 
0.083b 
(0.035) 
0.086c 
(0.050) 
ITL  0.041b 
(0.017) 
  0.032b 
(0.015) 
    
Sanction   0.091a 
(0.028) 
  0.079a 
(0.024) 
   
Enforced    0.098a 
(0.037) 
0.084b 
(0.035) 
0.086b 
(0.034) 
  0.078b 
(0.037) 
Effective Law       0.028a 
(0.009) 
  
Effective Sanction         0.080a 
(0.024) 
 
Tippee         0.021 
(0.043) 
Tipping         -0.039 
(0.032) 
Private         0.032 
(0.036) 
Criminal         0.093a 
(0.026) 
Damages         0.051 
(0.041) 
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Table 4 
OLS Outside Ownership (Continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant -0.083 
(0.166) 
-0.137 
(0.161) 
-0.013 
(0.158) 
0.049 
(0.169) 
-0.012 
(0.159) 
0.095 
(0.159) 
0.070 
(0.172) 
0.125 
(0.172) 
0.032 
(0.165) 
Observations 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
R2 0.537 0.609 0.628 0.639 0.680 0.706 0.647 0.655 0.735 
Linear Combination - - - - 0.116a 
(0.037) 
0.166a 
(0.039) 
- - 0.237a 
(0.071) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is outside ownership, calculated as the fraction of shares owned by all shareholders except the three largest 
shareholders in the ten largest non-financial domestic firms, from LLSV (1998).  The independent variables are the log of GNP; a 
dummy variable signifying legal origin, French, German or Scandinavian (the omitted dummy is English common law), from LLSV 
(1998); the insider trading law index (ITL); potential insider trading sanctions (Sanction); an enforcement dummy variable, Enforced, 
that equals one if the law has been enforced for the first time by 1994 and zero otherwise, from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2000); an 
interaction term, Effective Law (ITL times Enforced); another interactive term Effective Sanction (Sanction times Enforced); and each 
of the individual components of ITL (tippee, tipping, private, criminal and damages).  All variables are described in detail in the Data 
Appendix.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The superscripts a, b, c, and d denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively.   
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Table 5 
Instrumental Variables 
Outside Ownership and Insider Trading Law 
Dependent Variable: Outside Ownership 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log of GNP 0.041b 
(0.018) 
0.025a 
(0.021) 
0.012 
(0.024) 
0.011 
(0.026) 
0.013 
(0.033) 
0.005 
(0.034) 
-0.006 
(0.032) 
ITL 0.067 
(0.052) 
  0.007 
(0.065) 
   
Sanction  0.192c 
(0.114) 
  -0.014 
0.171 
  
Enforced   0.326a 
(0.112) 
0.320a 
(0.106) 
0.334a 
(0.128) 
  
Effective Law 
 
     0.087c 
(0.044) 
 
Effective Sanction        0.139c 
(0.070) 
Constant -0.151 
(0.224) 
0.066 
(0.201) 
0.249 
(0.263) 
0.235 
(0.228) 
0.246 
(0.292) 
0.345 
(0.363) 
0.237b 
(0.102) 
Observations 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
R2 0.301 0.263 . . . . 0.044 
Hausman Specification Test 
P > Chi2 
 
0.999* 
 
0.983* 
 
0.116d 
 
0.038b 
 
0.003a 
 
0.163* 
 
0.920* 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is outside ownership, calculated as the fraction of shares owned by all shareholders except 
the three largest shareholders in the ten largest non-financial domestic firms, from LLSV (1998).  The independent 
variables are the log of GNP; the insider trading law index (ITL); potential insider trading sanctions (Sanction); an 
enforcement dummy variable, Enforced, that equals one if the law has been enforced for the first time by 1994 and 
zero otherwise, from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2000); an interaction term, Effective Law (ITL times Enforced); and 
another interactive term Effective Sanction (Sanction times Enforced).  Legal origins (English common law, French 
civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law) are instruments for all of the insider trading law variables.  
All variables are described in detail in the Data Appendix.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The 
superscripts a, b, c, and d denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively.  * 
Signifies that the coefficient is not significantly different from OLS.   
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Table 6 
OLS Regressions – Synchronicity of Stock Prices and Insider Trading Law 
Dependent Variable:  Synchronicity of Stock Prices 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Log of GNP -1.605a 
(0.433) 
-1.587a 
(0.486) 
-1.309a 
(0.387) 
-1.164b 
(0.522) 
-1.501a 
(0.526) 
1.343b 
(0.512) 
-1.125c 
(0.595) 
-1.375b 
(0.551) 
-1.234b 
(0.528) 
-1.472b 
(0.654) 
GDP Growth 0.712a 
(0.235) 
0.720b 
(0.280) 
0.790a 
(0.297) 
0.815a 
(0.279) 
0.743b 
(0.293) 
0.780b 
(0.333) 
0.827b 
(0.319) 
0.777b 
(0.310) 
0.789a 
(0.288) 
0.536d 
(0.350) 
French Civil Law 1.657 
(1.588) 
-0.396 
(2.164) 
0.578 
(1.477) 
0.856 
(1.481) 
2.960c 
(1.743) 
0.600 
(1.459) 
0.822 
(1.488) 
1.366 
(1.525) 
1.212 
(1.526) 
1.024 
(1.520) 
German Civil Law 3.126c 
(1.582) 
1.628 
(2.264) 
2.087 
(1.740) 
2.031 
(1.834) 
1.507 
(1.914) 
2.132 
(1.819) 
1.974 
(1.940) 
2.729d 
(1.706) 
2.617c 
(1.652) 
3.685c 
(1.865) 
Scandinavian Civil Law 1.319 
(1.613) 
0.196 
(1.646) 
0.012 
(1.872) 
-0.696 
(1.812) 
1.507 
(1.914) 
-0.074 
(2.037) 
0.781 
(1.995) 
1.384 
(1.846) 
1.316 
(1.872) 
0.747 
(1.821) 
Antidirector Rights  -1.058d 
(0.670) 
        
ITL   -1.453b 
(0.599) 
  -1.473b 
(0.608) 
    
Sanction    -2.389b 
(1.173) 
  -2.364c 
(1.194) 
   
Enforced     -0.530 
(1.528) 
0.192 
(1.471) 
-0.220 
(1.488) 
  1.399 
(1.813) 
Effective Law        -0.301 
(0.435) 
  
Effective Sanction  
 
        -1.182 
(1.003) 
 
Tippee          -4.843c 
(2.456) 
Tipping          -0.556 
(1.442) 
Private           
Criminal          -1.586 
(1.385) 
Damages          -2.095 
(1.535) 
Constant 82.082a 
(5.790) 
85.618a 
(6.409) 
83.333a 
(5.255) 
79.033a 
(6.577) 
80.987a 
(6.848) 
83.747a 
(6.790) 
78.608a 
(7.474) 
79.662a 
(7.248) 
78.105a 
(6.974) 
86.902a 
(9.657) 
Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
R2 0.479 0.533 0.578 0.546 0.482 0.578 0.546 0.492 0.505 0.645 
Linear Combination  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
-1.281 
(1.539) 
-2.585 
(1.733) 
 
- 
 
- 
-7.563b 
(2.849) 
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Table 6 
OLS Regressions – Synchronicity of Stock Prices (Continued) 
Notes: The dependent variable is stock price synchronicity, calculated as the proportion of stock prices that moved in the same direction in an 
average week in 1995, from Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000).  The independent variables are the log of GNP; the growth rate of GDP; a 
dummy variable signifying legal origin, French, German or Scandinavian (the omitted dummy is English common law), from LLSV 
(1998); an antidirector rights score, from LLSV (1998); the insider trading law index (ITL); potential insider trading sanctions 
(Sanction); an enforcement dummy variable, Enforced, that equals one if the law has been enforced for the first time by 1994 and zero 
otherwise, from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2000); an interaction term, Effective law (ITL times Enforced); another interactive term, 
Effective Sanction (Sanction times Enforced); and each of the individual components of ITL (tippee, tipping , private, criminal and 
damages).  All variables are described in detail in the Data Appendix.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The 
superscripts a, b, c, and d denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
63
Beny:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
  61  
Table 7 
OLS Regressions – Stock Market Turnover 
Dependent Variable:  Log of Stock Market Turnover Ratio 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log of GNP 0.182c 
(0.102) 
0.141 
(0.100) 
0.172d 
(0.112) 
0.141 
(0.098) 
0.114 
(0.098) 
0.134 
(0.109) 
0.130 
(0.109) 
0.117 
(0.110) 
0.122 
(0.106) 
GDP Growth 0.022 
(0.042) 
0.009 
(0.043) 
0.020 
(0.044) 
0.001 
(0.052) 
-0.007 
(0.052) 
-0.000 
(0.053) 
0.001 
(0.048) 
0.001 
(0.049) 
0.014 
(0.040) 
Accounting Standards 0.033b 
(0.014) 
0.031a 
(0.011) 
0.032b 
(0.014) 
0.027c 
(0.014) 
0.026b 
(0.012) 
0.026c 
(0.014) 
0.028c 
(0.015) 
0.026b 
(0.012) 
0.035b 
(0.014) 
French Civil Law 0.478d 
(0.317) 
0.551c 
(0.308) 
0.491d 
(0.332) 
0.457d 
(0.292) 
0.528c 
(0.291) 
0.466d 
(0.309) 
0.483d 
(0.293) 
0.483d 
(0.288) 
0.507d 
(0.332) 
German Civil Law 1.109a 
(0.343) 
1.209a 
(0.302) 
1.126a 
(0.337) 
1.167a 
(0.375) 
1.244a 
(0.324) 
1.179a 
(0.365) 
1.200a 
(0.337) 
1.178a 
(0.347) 
1.226a 
(0.292) 
Scandinavian Civil Law 0.450b 
(0.186) 
0.603b 
(0.245) 
0.471b 
(0.203) 
0.388c 
(0.193) 
0.542b 
(0.245) 
0.404c 
(0.211) 
0.467b 
(0.218) 
0.489b 
(0.226) 
0.467 
(0.352) 
ITL  0.191d 
(0.115) 
  0.174 
(0.125) 
    
Sanction   0.063 
(0.178) 
  0.046 
(0.173) 
   
Enforced    0.284 
(0.303) 
0.215 
(0.317) 
0.280 
(0.310) 
  0.170 
(0.282) 
Effective Law 
 
      0.086 
(0.075) 
  
Effective Sanction  
 
       0.253 
(0.130) 
 
Tippee         0.302 
(0.250) 
Tipping         0.933c 
(0.457) 
Private         0.052 
(0.189) 
Criminal         -0.093 
(0.252) 
Damages         -0.083 
(0.258) 
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Table 7 
OLS Regressions –Turnover (Continued) 
 
          
Constant -1.133 
(1.487) 
-1.111 
(1.303) 
-1.027 
(1.537) 
-0.295 
(1.346) 
-0.477 
(1.263) 
-0.251 
(1.351) 
-0.290 
(1.642) 
0.044 
(1.480) 
-1.649 
(1.541) 
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
R2 0.494 0.544 0.496 0.516 0.556 0.517 0.524 0.526 0.670 
Linear Combination  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
0.389 
(0.299) 
0.326 
(0.340) 
 
- 
 
- 
1.280c 
(0.634) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the turnover ratio, calculated as the ratio of total value traded to stock market 
value, from International Finance Corporation (1996).  The independent variables are the log of GNP; the rate of 
growth of GDP; an index of accounting standards, a proxy for the quality of disclosure from LLSV (1998); a dummy 
variable signifying legal origin, French, German or Scandinavian (the omitted dummy is English common law), from 
LLSV (1998); the insider trading law index (ITL); potential insider trading sanctions (Sanction); an enforcement 
dummy variable, Enforced, that equals one if the law has been enforced for the first time by 1994 and zero otherwise, 
from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2000); an interaction term, Effective Law (ITL times Enforced); another interactive 
term Effective Sanction (Sanction times Enforced); and each of the individual components of ITL (tippee, tipping, 
private, criminal and damages).  All variables are described in detail in the Data Appendix.  Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  The superscripts a, b, c, and d denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% 
levels, respectively.   
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Table 8 
Random Effects Regression 
Ex Post Liquidity 
Dependent variable:  Log of Turnover Ratio 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log of GDP 0.745a 
(0.073) 
0.562a 
(0.073) 
0.654a 
(0.071) 
0.546a 
(0.070) 
French Civil Law -0.188 
(0.301) 
-0.080 
(0.291) 
-0.183 
(0.278) 
-0.082 
(0.273) 
German Civil Law -0.617 
(0.465) 
-0.197 
(0.451) 
-0.543 
(0.430) 
-0.190 
(0.424) 
Scandinavian Civil Law -0.214 
(0.555) 
-0.098 
(0.536) 
-0.209 
(0.513) 
-0.097 
(0.503) 
Insider Trading Law Exists  0.669a 
(0.068) 
 0.656a 
(0.072) 
Insider Trading Law Enforced   0.390a 
(0.110) 
0.067 
(0.110) 
Constant -20.183a 
(1.784) 
-16.161a 
(1.768) 
-18.000a 
(1.721) 
-15.778a 
(1.701) 
Observations 662 662 662 662 
R2 0.345 0.388 0.368 0.391 
Hausman Specification Test:  P > Chi2 0.000a 0.010a 0.000a 0.000a 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the annual turnover ratio (total value traded divided by stock 
market capitalization) measured over the period 1980-1997, from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 
(1999).  The independent variables include the log of annual GDP over the period 1980-1997 from 
World Bank (1999); legal origin dummies: French, German and Scandinavian civil law (the omitted 
dummy is English common law); an indicator variable, “insider trading law exists” that equals one if 
the country has insider trading laws, and zero otherwise, from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2000); and 
an indicator variable, “insider trading law enforced” that equals one if the country has enforced its 
insider trading laws at least once, and zero otherwise, from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2000).  Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The superscripts a, b, c, and d denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively.   
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Table 9 
Instrumental Variables Regression 
Ex Post Liquidity 
Dependent variable:  Log of Turnover Ratio 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Log of GDP 0.414a 
(0.046) 
0.473a 
(0.061) 
0.487a 
(0.079) 
Insider Trading Law Exists 2.599b 
(1.104) 
 3.165b 
(1.472) 
Insider Trading Law Enforced  -0.014 
(1.011) 
-1.563 
(1.444) 
Constant -13.593a 
(1.016) 
-13.762a 
(1.414) 
-15.519a 
(2.110) 
Observations 662 662 662 
R2 . 0.333 . 
Hausman Specification Test: P > Chi2 0.062c 0.148d 0.001a 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the annual turnover ratio (total value traded divided 
by stock market capitalization) measured over the period 1980-1997, from Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999).  The independent variables include the log of annual 
GDP over the period 1980-1997 from World Bank (1999); an indicator variable, “Insider 
Trading Law Exists” that equals one if the country has insider trading laws, and zero 
otherwise, from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2000); and an indicator variable, “Insider 
Trading Law Enforced” that equals one if the country has enforced its insider trading 
laws at least once, and zero otherwise, from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2000).  Legal 
origins (English common law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil 
law) are instruments for all of the insider trading law variables.  Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses.  The superscripts a, b, c, and d denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels, respectively.   
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